“Life is like riding a
bicycle. To keep your balance you must keep moving” – Albert Einstein
In my October 2014 article (http://poleconomyindia.blogspot.in/2014/10/deflation-and-liquidity.html)
I had pointed how the global imbalance in savings and investment was at the
heart of the global slowdown. I had written “The other side of this coin of
global slowdown and imbalances as I have pointed earlier is the saving-investment
(S-I) mismatch. Globally, Savings has to be equal to Investments. But as
country, if savings is greater than investments it manifests itself in the
country having a current account surplus (exporting capital) and vice versa.” Another
way of arriving at current account is (X-M)+NY+NCT, where X and M are
respectively the export and import of goods and services, NY the net income
from abroad, and NCT the net current transfers. The table below shows the
trends in current account balances since 2007:
Country / CA
($bn)
|
2007
|
2012
|
2015E
|
2020E
|
US
|
–718.6
|
–449.7
|
–460.6
|
–746.9
|
Euro Area
|
10.6
|
154.1
|
364.6
|
326.8
|
Germany
|
232.5
|
240.8
|
286.3
|
270.3
|
France
|
–8.0
|
–32.0
|
–5.2
|
–7.9
|
Italy
|
–31.3
|
–8.9
|
37.0
|
10.1
|
Spain
|
–142.9
|
–3.8
|
10.6
|
22.4
|
Japan
|
212.1
|
59.7
|
124.3
|
130.7
|
UK
|
–81.3
|
–98.2
|
–135.8
|
–86.1
|
Other Advanced
|
192.8
|
266.6
|
319.7
|
312.7
|
Russia
|
71.3
|
71.3
|
61.8
|
80.5
|
China
|
353.2
|
215.4
|
347.8
|
95.3
|
India
|
–15.7
|
–88.2
|
–30.4
|
–86.5
|
Brazil
|
1.6
|
–84.4
|
–72.8
|
–78.2
|
Mexico
|
–14.7
|
–16.4
|
–27.9
|
–31.9
|
Larger Middle-East
|
264.9
|
419.1
|
–113.4
|
–14.2
|
Quick takeaways on the past
trends:
- US, UK, India and Brazil continue to be the demand centers of the world of which US is the outsized buyer of global demand;
- With the German imposition of fiscal discipline in the Euro area demand in the southern European states have contracted dramatically;
- Japan’s change in balance has been more due to the nuclear power shut-down post Fukushima and consequent increase in energy imports;
- Russian oil exports will contract dramatically but so will imports leaving the balance in place but with a contracting GDP;
- Middle-East will play out very similar to Russia only to the extent that given the outsized social spends they may not be able reduce imports as fast;
- China growth decline is having an outsized impact on metal exporting countries and the declining currency should continue to counteract the desire to rebalance towards a consumer economy. The data below plays out the dramatic impact of China’s slowdown will have on the commodity exporters:
Bilateral Metal Trade (US$ m)
|
2002
|
2014
|
Australia
|
1,043
|
52,153
|
Brazil
|
605
|
12,851
|
Canada
|
90
|
2,496
|
Chile
|
784
|
15,249
|
Peru
|
196
|
5,621
|
Just as an aside, this decline in
global commodities will cause a dramatic shrinkage and asset problems in
financial balance sheets across the globe.
Where I disagree with the IMF
forecasts for 2020 is on four key linear un-said assumptions underlying these
forecasts:
- Americans will continue to tolerate their demand being used by other nations to allow things to revert to 2007 (despite shale oil) and will not turn protectionist or have preferential trade deals (i.e. TPP is designed to exclude the Chinese and therefore changing supply chains);
- Technology innovations like additive printing or solar energy will make no impact on manufacturing locations (Germany, Korea, Japan) or on energy producers (Middle-east);
- Chinese will be able to generate significant domestic consumption in a short period of 5 years despite adverse demographics, currency decline and inequality (http://poleconomyindia.blogspot.in/2015/08/china-everything-overdone.html);
- Southern European countries will continue with the German mandated fiscal bounds and bear the high unemployment and internal cost adjustments (i.e. wage deflation).
As we can see the global imbalances continue to
be substantially where they were in 2007. A quote from T. S. Eliot summarizes it wonderfully, “We shall not cease from exploration, and
the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we started and know the
place for the first time.”
Post-script
Oil ($)*
|
1997-2006
|
2007
|
2012
|
2014
|
2015E
|
2016E
|
31.2
|
71.1
|
105.0
|
96.3
|
51.6
|
50.4
|
Source: IMF, *Simple average of prices of U.K. Brent, Dubai Fateh, and
West Texas Intermediate crude oil
Oil prices have been on a downward tear since
2014 crushing inflation across the globe causing an estimated shift in
resources exceeding $1 trillion. Current price for this resource in under $40,
markets looking to push it under $30. This may, however, turn out to be the
savior of global central banks if it completes its correction in 2016 and rises
enough to boost global inflation to 2%. If it overshoots, it turn out to be
nightmare but there is always cover available under Core CPI which the central
banks may use but I as a consumer do not care. (US
example - “The BLS does track Energy as a separate aggregate index, which in
recent years has been assigned a relative importance of 8.030 out of 100.”)