“Whenever someone
starts talking about 'fair competition' or indeed, about 'fairness' in general,
it is time to keep a sharp eye on your wallet, for it is about to be picked.”
― Murray N. Rothbard
The global economy has been struggling, to say the least, since
the Global Financial Crises of 2008. When the financial crises occurred US and
Europe started a process of monetary stimulus, an experiment with ‘zero bound’.
The Chinese saw demand destruction like never before, 25% of their exports
vanished and 25m migrant workers had to come back home. This prospect of
instability made Chinese government embark on an unprecedented fixed asset
expansion program to maintain demand and employment. This were funded by bank
loans, by the same banks controlled by the government.
Gross Capital Formation (US$ bn)
|
2000
|
2008
|
2015
|
2008-2015
|
CAGR 2000 –
2015
|
CAGR 2000 -
2008
|
CAGR 2008 –
2015
|
China
|
367
|
1,127
|
4,553
|
22,074
|
18.3%
|
15.0%
|
22.1%
|
US
|
2,077
|
3,233
|
3,299
|
24,109
|
3.1%
|
5.7%
|
0.3%
|
Euro Area
|
1,599
|
2,603
|
2,588
|
22,365
|
3.3%
|
6.3%
|
-0.1%
|
Japan
|
1,022
|
988
|
1,042
|
8,657
|
0.1%
|
-0.4%
|
0.8%
|
World
|
7,266
|
12,427
|
19,215
|
128,038
|
6.7%
|
6.9%
|
6.4%
|
% of World
|
|||||||
China
|
5%
|
9%
|
24%
|
17%
|
Source: World Bank
While this expansion was taking place, it is interesting to
see how household final consumption shaped up during the same period.
Household Final Consumption (US$ bn)
|
2000
|
2008
|
2015
|
2008-2015
|
CAGR 2000 –
2015
|
CAGR 2000 -
2008
|
CAGR 2008 –
2015
|
China
|
568
|
1,660
|
4,251
|
23,295
|
14.4%
|
14.4%
|
14.4%
|
US
|
6,792
|
10,014
|
12,284
|
87,311
|
4.0%
|
5.0%
|
3.0%
|
Euro Area
|
3,673
|
7,833
|
6,367
|
58,226
|
3.7%
|
9.9%
|
-2.9%
|
Japan
|
2,674
|
2,826
|
2,416
|
24,479
|
-0.7%
|
0.7%
|
-2.2%
|
World
|
20,203
|
36,446
|
42,608
|
3,25,058
|
5.1%
|
7.7%
|
2.3%
|
% of World
|
|||||||
China
|
3%
|
5%
|
10%
|
7%
|
Source: World Bank
So, the critical questions anyone would ask:
- Why are the Chinese who have only 7% of Household Final Consumption spending 17% of the Global Capital Formation post 2008?
- Why has global demand not expanded at a faster pace despite so much central bank stimulus globally with Capital Formation expanding 6% but demand only 2%?
When the Global Financial Crises struck, the Chinese
government seeing the retrenchment of demand embarked on massive capital asset
formation, the fixed asset formation expanded faster than before 2008 to the
point where it spending more than Euro a rea or US. This capital expansion did
rescue the global economy initially. The expansion had two elements. The first
was in capacity building in different industries (a significant proportion was
related to construction) to the extent there is overcapacity in excess of 30%
in sectors like iron and steel, glass, cement, aluminium, solar panel, and
power generation equipment. China exports US$2.3trn worth of goods around the
world with electronic equipment and machinery making up almost half of it. By
some estimates, Chinese has the capability to export another US$2trn globally
given its overcapacity. The second part is in property, China has invested
since 1998 more than 15% of GDP in property or something like 40% of Gross
Capital Formation. By 2025, they plan to move 600m people to urban centres,
like building all the cities of Europe in less than a generation. Property
investment creates income for local provinces and municipalities (it is also
their main source) which then use this income to for their pet expansion
programs, industry incentivisation and employment generation programs. Thus,
increasing property prices every year helps not only the wealth effect of the
populace but also ensures larger and larger availability of money for the
provincial governments. Politics is intricately linked to economics.
While this was happening at one end of the globe, the other
end was busy providing financial stimulus. But this created no jobs as Chinese
overcapacity swallowed whatever excess demand that was created at whatever
price. Of course, demand growth was impacted by declining population and aging.
With lack of jobs, there could never be any meaningful and sustainable
expansion in consumption. The financial stimulus consequently, instead of
working in its traditional ways helped expand financial asset prices – stocks,
bonds, property, wine, art or fur. We have, therefore, seen inequality grow
across the globe.
We've used up a lot of
bullets. And we talk about stimulus. But the truth is, we're running a federal
deficit that's 9 percent of GDP. That is stimulative as all get out. It's more
stimulative than any policy we've followed since World War II. - Warren Buffett
China may propound itself to be virtue of free market world.
It is hardly for the reason of political stability (e.g. global media or
internet access), overcapacity and local capability development in key
industries. For example, as Dr Balding points out:
- An average Chinese tariff rate of 3.4% compared to the US rate of 2.6%. China maintains a 9.9% average rate for other WTO members while the US has a 2.5% weighted average for WTO members;
- China maintains a long “negatives” list of industries in which foreigners simply cannot invest. This includes such high tech national security industries as cotton. Even now, most investors require a Chinese joint venture partner and are simply prohibited from having a wholly owned Chinese subsidiary;
- China continues to restrict international capital flows despite joining the IMF SDR and promoting RMB internationalization. Excluding flows within China controlled territory, the RMB ranks below the Danish krone for international payments and transactions.
This brings us to today’s fork:
- The Chinese desperately want access to the global markets especially the US (>25% of global demand) while keeping its demand to itself to sustain industry and employment;
- One Belt One Road is as much an economic manifestation of this as it is geopolitical;
- Investment is done with Chinese money and conditionality’s such that the construction activities are taken up by Chinese companies (nothing unusual here, JICA or EXIM does the similar);
- The monies lent unless it gives an adequate economic return may leave high levels of debt in emerging countries i.e. Venezuela where the decline in oil prices have put US$18bn of China financing at risk or like Sri Lanka where high levels of debt have resulted in 80% of a port being handed over to China;
- Given the deterioration of the Chinese economy (overcapacity and high levels of debt), Chinese people are sending their savings abroad parking in real estate or acquiring companies at high valuations, this is putting pressure on the RMB (devaluation expectations run as high as 30-40% if the central bank stops intervening):
- Almost till 2013, China had bought US$ to maintain the low value of the currency but now despite the massive current account surplus the outflow is unprecedented causing continuous haemorrhaging of the currency reserves;
- Politicians globally, whether they understand this or are just seeing implications in their home markets, are responding with rising protectionist sentiment in Europe and the US, Trump is just an extreme version of this sentiment.
It is clear that this will not end well. Low rates have
created a world of high debt and overvaluation, retracement of both is
detrimental for economic progress and the overcapacity China has created may
take over a decade to clear out. Continuing issues of Eurozone and Middle-East
and global aging make things only worse. None of the parties involved seem to
be able or willing to normalize their paths on their own, which likely means a
crisis that sparks the adjustment.
Take your pick…